

THE TRUE AMERICAN.

Devoted to Universal Liberty: Gradual Emancipation in Kentucky: Literature: Agriculture: Elevation of Labor, Morally and Politically: Commercial Intelligence, &c. &c.

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POETRY.

THE UNITED STATES.

BY JOHN KEEL.

Thy name the father West! be thou too warred,
Whose eagle wings are thine own green world o'er-

spread,
Touching two oceans; wherefore hast thou scorned
Thy father's God, O proud and full of bread?

Why lies the cross unloved on thy ground,
While in mid-air thy stars and arrows flout?

That thief of fate, that thief of time, that thief of
Except, disarmed of thy vain earthly vanities,
Thou bring it to be blessed with salute and

angels' laud!
The holy seed, by heaven's peculiar grace,
Is rooted here and there in thy dark woods;

But many a rank weed round it grows apace,
And Mammon builds beside thy nighty floods,
O'er-topping Nature, braving Nature's God;

Oh, while the free days to be far, fruitful land,
Ere war and want have stained thy virgin sod,
Mark thee a place on high, a glorious strand,
Where 'neath the sign may make a forest, lake

and perchance
Eastward, this hour, perchance thou turn'st thine
Languishing lips with the morning sun;

Blend sounds of rain from a loud ocean dear
To heaven, Oh trying hour for thee!
Tyre mocked when Salom fell! Where now is
Thy

Heaven was against her. Nations thick as waves,
Burnt o'er her walls, to ocean down and fire;
And now her useless waste idly laves
Her towers, and her dead heap her crown'd

merchants' graves.
PILGRIM SONG.
BY GEORGE LEE.

Over the mountain waves, where they come;
Storm-cloud and wintry wind welcome them home;
Yet, where the sounding gale howls to the sea,
There their song peals loud, and deep and free;

Pilgrims and wanderers, hither we come,
Where the free days to be far, fruitful land,
England hath many a day, sweet they bloom;
Scath heath heath-hills, dearly their perfume;

Yet through the wilderness cheerful we stray,
Native land, native land—home far away!
Pilgrims and wanderers, &c.

Dim grew the forest path; onward they trod;
Faint beat their noble hearts, trusting in God;
Gray morn and blooming morn, high rose their song,
Here it sweeps, clear and deep ever along;

Pilgrims and wanderers, &c.

Not theirs the glory-wreath, torn by the blast;
Heavenward they look, heavenward they pass;
Green be their many graves, one be their fame,
While their song peals along, ever the same:

Pilgrims and wanderers, &c.

ANTI-SLAVERY.

DOMESTIC SLAVERY CONSIDERED AS A

SCRIPTURAL INSTITUTION.

In a Correspondence between the Rev. RICHARD

FULLER, of Brimfield, S. C., and the Rev. F. C.

WELLES, of Providence, R. I.—

Revised and corrected by the Authors.

LETTER II.

To the Rev. Richard Fuller, D. D.

MY DEAR BROTHER—

In my last letter I took notice of some incidental points alluded to in your letter on domestic slavery. My object was to show that while the North had erred in its manner of treating this subject, this error had been by no means peculiar to the North; and also that the sensitiveness in regard to it, which has of late become so universal at the South, had no existence in the early periods of this country. It seems to me desirable that the position of both parties should be changed; that the North should treat this subject by calm yet earnest appeals to the understanding and conscience of their fellow-citizens at the South, and that the South should invite the freest possible discussion of it, from what quarter soever it may proceed, so long as it confine itself within these limits.

In your letter it is stated that "the thing affirmed and denied, is that slavery is a moral evil." "That slavery is, in itself, a sin; a sin amid any circumstances." You also, with great truth and frankness, add, "if slavery be a sin, it is the immediate duty of masters to abolish it, whatever be the result; this you urge and this I grant." I believe that in these latter expressions you give utterance to the real sentiments of your heart. I believe that you have submitted yourself without reserve to the whole will of God, in so far as He shall reveal to you. I well know the flattering prospects which you abandoned in order to become a preacher of the gospel of Christ. I believe that the same principles would govern you in this case; and that as soon as you shall be convinced that the rule of Christian duty requires of you any other course of conduct than that which you now adopt, you will, at any sacrifice whatever, act in accordance with your convictions. It is in this confidence that I address you on this subject with peculiar pleasure. I hope that if I am convinced of error, I shall be enabled to act from the same principles.

It may perhaps be proper to state that I have never expressed my views of slavery in the form to which you have alluded. The assertion is ambiguous in its meaning, and may admit of several very different answers. I could not pretend either to affirm or deny it, in this indefinite and indeterminate sense. It will be necessary therefore to fix its different meanings, and then offer my views upon each of them.

You remark, it is affirmed that "slavery is a moral evil." This you deny; and you assert, as I suppose, on the contrary, that slavery is not, in itself, a moral evil.

You delineate slavery to be "an obligation to labor for the benefit of the master, without the consent or consent of the slave." I understand you, in this, to assert, that the master has a right to oblige the slave to labor for his (the master's) benefit, without the consent or consent of the slave. Now, if the master enjoy this right, he enjoys also the right to use all the means necessary both to enforce and to render it permanent.

He has a right to protect himself against every thing that would interfere with the exercise of this right. If the intellectual or moral cultivation of the slave would interfere with the master's power to enforce this right, he has the right to arrest this cultivation at any point he chooses, or to abolish it altogether. If this right exist, therefore, I do not perceive that any exception can be taken to the sternest laws which have ever been enacted in any of the Southern States, even though they prohibit, under the severest penalties, the education of negroes, and forbid them to assemble for the worship of God, except under the strictest surveillance.

I do not really see how these two rights can be separated. Either the right of the master to oblige the slave to labor without his consent, confers the right over his intellectual and moral nature, or it does not. If it does, then it may be rightfully exercised. It is a right given me by God, over another, and I may use it innocently, at my own discretion; that is, I may control his intellectual and moral nature just in so far as is necessary in order to secure to myself the exercise of the original right which God has given me. If, on the other hand, it does not exist, then the slave in these respects stands to me in precisely the same relation as any other man. I have no more right to interfere with his intellectual or moral improvement than with that of any other man. He is in these respects as free as I am myself, and to interfere with him is both cruel and unjust. Nay more, I am bound to use all the means in my power to elevate and improve him, just as I am bound to do good to all other men, as I have opportunity.

Or to state the matter in another form. The right of the master over the slave, and the right of the slave freely to enjoy the blessings of moral and intellectual cultivation, and the privileges of domestic society, are manifestly conflicting rights. One or the other must overrule. If the right of the slave be the predominant right, it abolishes the right of the master wherever this right interferes with it.

Were I, therefore, to define the right of slavery, I should go somewhat further than you have gone. I suppose it to be the right to oblige another to labor for me, without his consent or consent, with the additional right to use all the means necessary to insure the exercise of the original right.

But it is asserted that "slavery is not a moral evil." Here I think a most important distinction is to be taken. The terms moral evil may be used to designate two ideas widely dissimilar from each other, and depending upon entirely different principles. In the one sense it means wrong, the violation of the relations which exist between the parties, the transgression of a moral law of God. In the other sense it signifies the personal guilt which attaches to the being who does the wrong, violates the obligation, or transgresses the law. In the first sense, moral evil depends upon the immutable relations which God has established between his moral creatures. In the second sense, meaning personal guilt, it depends upon light, knowledge of duty, means of obtaining information on the subject, and may be different in different persons and at different times. It is manifest that we can take no proper view of the question before us, without considering these two meanings separately.

It has seemed to me that much of the misunderstanding which has existed on this subject has arisen from the want of attention to this obvious distinction. We, at the North have considered too exclusively the first, and you, at the South as exclusively the second, of these meanings of the terms moral evil. The one party has shown that slavery is always a violation of right, and has inferred that therefore it always involves equal guilt. The other party has urged the circumstances in which they and their slaves are placed, and has aimed to show that in their present condition they are not necessarily chargeable with guilt, and hence have inferred that slavery is not a wrong, or the violation of any moral law.

Let us endeavor calmly to consider both of these meanings of the phrase moral evil.

In the first sense, when we affirm that slavery is not a moral evil, we affirm that to hold a man in slavery as it has been above explained, is not a violation of the law of God, and is at variance with no moral relation existing between man and man. Now I believe directly the reverse of this. I believe it to be wrong, utterly and absolutely at variance with the relations which God has established between his moral and intelligent creatures. My reasons for holding this opinion are briefly as follows:

I suppose that "God, of one blood, made all men that dwell upon the earth,"—that we are all partakers of the same nature, as we are all the children of one common parent. I suppose that this common nature is not affected, in any respect, by the color of the skin, the difference of the hair, or by any other variety of physical formation. I believe also that this common nature remains the same under every degree of intellectual development. A man may be wiser or less wise, he may be, more or less, endowed with mental capacity, he may be more or less ignorant than himself, he may have more or less of the same nature, but the difference affects not the common nature. It is in every respect, notwithstanding all this, as perfectly a human being as myself; and he stands with me in precisely the same relation to the Creator and Father of us all.

I believe that every human being is endowed with an immortal soul, and that he is placed in the present state of probation, a candidate for everlasting happiness or everlasting woe. He has an intellect capable of endless progression in knowledge, and is animated with a desire to improve that intellect to the utmost; and God has given him a right to improve it, to whatever extent he pleases. He is endowed with a conscience which renders him susceptible of moral obligations both to God and to man. In virtue of this endowment, it is his imperative duty to seek by all the means in his power to know the will of God, and it is his inalienable right to serve God in the manner which he believes will be most pleasing to the Creator. He has powers of external action, and by means of his intellect he may use these powers for the improvement of his own condition, and provided hence then not in violation of the equal rights of his brethren, he may employ them as he will, and the result of this employment is strictly and exclusively his own.

But more than this. Every human being is a fallen creature. He is a sinner against God, and is exposed, for his transgressions, to the condemnation of everlasting death. God so loved him that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life. To every one possessing this nature, Jesus

Christ has made, in the gospel, the offer of eternal salvation. The New Testament constitutes this message, and it is addressed to every child of Adam. Upon our understanding and obeying it, the eternal destiny of every one of us depends. Every human being has a perfect right to know every word that God has addressed to him, and as perfect a right to the use of all the means by which this knowledge may be obtained. These rights and obligations seem to me to arise specially and exclusively from the relations established by God between the creature and himself, and therefore with no other creature of God, not even the angels of heaven have a right to interfere. They were ordained from the beginning, ere ever

"The hills were formed, the fountains opened,
Or the sea with all its roaring multitude of waves;"
and no ordinance of man can in any manner vary or annul them.

I may go farther, and observe, that by the will of the creator certain subordinate and temporary relations are established among human beings. Among these are the relations of husband and wife, and parent and child. From these relations certain obligations arise, and for the fulfilment of these obligations, God holds the parties individually responsible to him. With these obligations no other human being has a right to interfere. The laws which God has given respecting them in his word, transcend and overrule and abrogate all counteracting laws of man. Every man is bound to obey these laws which God himself has enacted, nor can any man rightfully present any obstacle to this obedience. I might pursue this subject further, but I have said enough to illustrate the nature of my belief.

That all these ideas are involved in the conception of a human nature, I think no one can deny. And if this be not denied, I do not perceive how the subject in this view admits of any argument. It is a matter of immediate moral consciousness. I know and feel that by virtue of my creation, I possess such a nature. I feel that the rights which I have described were conferred on me by the immediate endowment of God. I felt that with the exercise of these my rights, no created being can interfere, without doing me an aggravated wrong, and violating the law to which we are both subjected by our Creator. I am sure, my brother, that you feel all this as keenly as any man alive. You feel it, not by virtue of any constitution of government, or any enactment of civil law, but simply and truly because you are a man. And is not every other man, for precisely the same reason, endowed with the same rights, and is not the violation of these rights as great a wrong in his case as in either yours or my own?

To present this subject in a simple light. Let us suppose that your family and mine were neighbors. We, our wives and children, are all human beings in the sense that I have described, and in consequence of that common nature, and by the will of our common Creator, are subject to the law, *Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.* Suppose that I should set fire to your house, shoot you as you come out of it, and seize upon your wife and children, "oblige them to labor for my benefit, without their consent or consent." Suppose, moreover, unless I could not thus oblige them, unless they were inferior in intellect to myself, I should forbid them to read, and thus consign them to intellectual or moral blindness. Suppose I should measure out to them the knowledge of God on the same principle. Suppose I should exercise this dominion over them and their children as long as I lived, and then do all in my power to render it certain that my children should exercise it after me. The question before me I suppose to be simply this, would I, in so doing, act at variance with the many relations existing between us as creatures of God? Would I, in other words, violate the supreme law of my Creator, *Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself*, or that other, *Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them*? I do not see how any intelligent creature can give more than one answer to this question. Then I think that every intelligent creature must affirm that to do this is wrong, or, in the other form of expression, that it is a great moral evil. Can we conceive of any greater?

Now, suppose my neighbor offers me money, and I, for the sake of this money, transfer some of these children to him, and he proceeds, as I did before him, to "make them labor for his benefit, without their consent or consent," and takes all the means as before stated, which shall enable him to exercise this power. Does this transfer of money from him to me in any respect modify the relations which exist between him and them, as creatures of God, or abolish that law by which God has ordained that all our actions towards each shall be governed? They are the same human beings, possessing the same human nature, and they stand in the same relations to God and to each other as before. The transfer of silver from him to me neither makes one party more nor the other party less than human beings; hence their actions are to be judged of by precisely the same rule as if no such transfer had been made. Hence I cannot resist the conclusion that the act in question is, as before, wrong; and that slavery, with this modification, is again, as before, a "moral evil."

I will offer but one more supposition. Suppose that any number, for instance, one-half of the females in our neighborhood, should agree to treat the other half in the manner that I have described. Suppose we should by law enact that the weaker half should be slaves, that we would exercise over them the authority of masters, prohibit by law their instruction, and concert among ourselves the means for holding them permanently in their present situation. In what manner would this alter the moral aspect of the case?

A law, in this instance, is merely a determination of the stronger party to hold the weaker party in bondage; and a contract with each other, by which the whole power is pledged to each individual, so far as it shall be necessary, in order to enable him to hold in bondage his portion of the weaker party.

Now I cannot see that this in any respect changes the nature of the parties. They remain, as before, human beings, possessing the same intellectual and moral nature, holding the same relations to each other and to God, and still under the same unchangeable law, *Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.* By the act of holding a man in bondage, this law is violated. Wrong is done, moral evil is committed. In the former case it was done by the individual and the society. Before the formation of this compact, the individual was responsible only for his

own wrong; now he is responsible both for his own, and also, since he is a member of the society, for all the wrong which the society binds itself to uphold and render perpetual.

The Scriptures frequently allude to the fact, that wrong done by law, that is, by society, is uncleanable to the same retribution as wrong done by the individual. Thus, Psalm xciv. 20-23: "Will the throne of iniquity have fellowship with thee, which frameth mischief by a law, and giveth itself up to scorn against the soul of the righteous, and counteth him iniquitous blood? But the Lord is on my side, and my God is the rock of my refuge. And he shall bring upon them their own iniquity, and shall cut them off from their own wickedness; yea, the Lord our God shall cut them off." So also Isaiah x. 1-5: "We unto them that decrease in righteousness, and that write grievousness which they have prescribed; to turn aside the needy from judgment, and to take away the right from the poor of my people, that widows may be their prey, and that they may rob the fatherless! And what will ye do in the day of visitation, and in the desolation which shall come from far? to whom will ye flee for help? and where will ye leave your glory? Without me they shall bow down under the prisoners, and they shall fall under the slain. For all this his anger is not turned away, but his hand is stretched out still. Besides, persecution is always perpetrated by law; but this in no manner affects its moral character.

There is, however, one point of difference, which arises from the fact that this wrong has been established by law. It becomes a social wrong. The individual, or those who have preceded him, may have surrendered their individual right over to the society. In this case it may happen that the individual cannot act as he might have acted if the law had not been made. In this case the evil can only be eradicated by changing the opinions of the society, and thus persuading them to abolish the law. It will however be apparent that this, as I said before, does not change the relation of the parties either to each other or to God. The wrong exists as before. The individual act is wrong. The whole society, in putting the law into execution, is doing wrong. Before, only the individual, now the whole society becomes the wrong-doer, and for that wrong both the individual and the society are held responsible in the sight of God.

I have thus endeavored as clearly as possible to illustrate my views upon the question—is slavery a moral evil? understanding by these terms, wrong, or violation of moral law. The consideration of the second meaning of the phrase I must reserve for another occasion. It may, perhaps, be proper for me here to state, once for all, that in these remarks and those that may follow, I speak as the organ of no party and of no sect. I belong to none. I am not and I never have been connected with any abolition society, and I believe I have read as much on one side of this question as on the other. I write what seem to me the simple dictates of my individual understanding and conscience, enlightened I hope by the teachings of the Holy Scriptures. Nay, I affirm that the doctrines which I have advanced are by necessity involved in the character which I hold as an American citizen. I do not know that I have uttered a single sentiment which is not comprehended in the notable words which form the introduction to our Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident," (that is, so evident that they are, from the principles of the human mind, admitted as soon as they are stated,) "that all men are created equal," (that is, equal in right to use the endowments of the Creator as they choose, though not equal in endowments,) "that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights," (that is rights from which they cannot be rightfully alienated,) "and that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." I do not know how else in so few words I could express my opinions on this subject.

I am, my dear brother, yours with every sentiment of regard.

THE AUTHOR OF THE MORAL SCIENCE.

LETTER III.

To the Rev. Richard Fuller, D. D.

MY DEAR BROTHER—

In my last letter I endeavored to show that the right of slavery, if it exists, is not only the right "to oblige another to labor for our benefit, without his consent or consent," but also the right to use all the means necessary for the establishment and perpetuity of this right. Wherever slavery is established by law, I believe this power is conferred by society upon the master, and therefore it would be absurd to suppose that it is not generally exercised. I also attempted to show that when we assert or deny that slavery is a moral evil, the terms "moral evil," are susceptible of two very dissimilar meanings. They may mean either wrong, or violation of right, transgression of moral law; or they may mean the guilt which attaches to the person who does the wrong. I endeavored also to show that, taken in the first of these senses, slavery is, from the very nature of the case, essentially a moral evil—that it is a violation of the rights of man; and a transgression of that law under which all human beings are created, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." That the moral character of the relation is the same, whether the master be the captor or the purchaser of the slave; whether his power be upheld by his own individual powers, or by the combined authority of society.

I proceed now to consider the second meaning of the assertion—slavery is or is not a moral evil. We now mean by this assertion, that whoever holds a fellow-man in bondage is guilty of sin. To this assertion let us now direct our attention.

Supposing a moral law to exist, on the guilt in violating it, as well as our virtue in obeying it, depends in the first place upon our knowledge of its existence. If we have never known that such a law has been enacted, we may be free from guilt though we violate it. If, on the other hand, we know of its existence, and with adequate knowledge of our duty, violate it, we incur, without mitigation, the guilt of our transgression.

Again, the guilt of violating a moral law must depend not only upon our knowledge, but upon our opportunities for the acquisition of knowledge. Two men may both violate a law in ignorance, but the one may have had every opportunity of acquiring a complete knowledge of his duty; the

other may have been deprived of all such opportunities whatever. Their guilt will, in these cases, be very dissimilar. He who refuses to be informed concerning his duty, is voluntarily ignorant. His ignorance is his own fault, and he is justly responsible for all the consequences of his own act. The master in law clearly anticipates this case—"No man may take advantage of his own wrong," neither words, nor man may plead ignorance as an excuse, when ignorance rather than knowledge is his own deliberate choice.

I am prepared to go further than this. Knowledge of my duty may be offered to me, but offered so countenanced with error, and in a manner so repulsive to all my feelings of self-respect, that I instinctively reject it. In this case the guilt of rejecting knowledge of my duty is obviously less than it would have been if the same truth, unmingled with error, and clothed in the clarity of the gospel, had been presented to my understanding. For instance, I am an instructor. In the discharge of my duties I may unwittingly adopt unsound principles. Suppose a stranger wishes to correct my errors, and introduces himself by stating as facts what I know to be exaggerations, and by loading me with gross and offensive personal abuse. I know that I ought to bear it calmly, and carefully discriminating between the good and the bad, to use both as a means of self-improvement. I fear, however, that I should be, at the best, prejudiced against such instructions, and that some time would elapse before this discrimination could take place. I grant that I should do wrong in allowing my judgement to be biased by this abuse. But it is certainly as true that he who, wrong in abusing me. It is his abuse that has rendered me unwilling to be convinced, when I might have been convinced on the instant, if he had treated me with Christian courtesy. My ignorance is therefore the combined result of his unchristian want of kindness and my unchristian want of meekness. The responsibility clearly attaches to both of us. Which of us will bear the larger portion of it, can only be known when the secrets of all hearts shall be revealed.

I see not why these principles do not apply to the present case. And hence, among those who, as I believe in violation of right, hold human beings in bondage, there may be found every possible gradation of guiltiness. There may be many persons in our Southern states who have been reared in the midst of slavery, who have uniformly treated their slaves humanely; and who, having always seen the subject discussed in such a manner that they have been instinctively repelled from it, have never yet deliberately investigated it as a question of duty. Slaves have been held by those whom the slaveholders most venerate among the dead, and by those whom they most respect among the living. It is surprising to observe how long even a good man, under such circumstances, may continue in the practice of wrong, without ever suspecting its moral character. Of this fact the temperance reformation has furnished a thousand remarkable instances. It is only a few years since many of our most estimable citizens were acquiring their wealth by the manufacture and sale of spirituous liquors; that is by means of the wholesale destruction, both temporal and eternal, of their fellow-men. Yet, strange as it may now seem, it never occurred to them that they were doing wrong. I remember very well that when this subject was first agitated in New England, I made it the theme of two fast-day discourses. In the course of the following week, a member of my church, one of the most conscientious men I have ever known, a wholesale grocer, said to me, "If your doctrine be true, I do not see how I can continue to deal in spirituous liquors." I believe that the thought had never crossed his mind before. He examined the subject carefully, became fully convinced of his duty, and abandoned the traffic. Yet he had attained to more than middle life, and had been from youth a man of exemplary piety, without having been aware that he was doing wrong, and continued in the practice of it.

Now all this absence of consideration may exist among many persons at the South, on the subject of slavery. It has, under almost as peculiar circumstances, existed at the North. I have been told that the Rev. Dr. Stiles, afterwards President of Yale College, during his residence in Newport, R. I., being in want of a domestic, sent by the captain of a slave-ship a barrel of rum to the coast of Africa, to be exchanged for a slave. The venture was successful, and in due time a negro boy was brought back. It chanced that some time afterwards, in passing through his kitchen, he observed the boy in tears. He asked him the reason of his sorrow, and the poor fellow answered that he was thinking of his parents, and brothers and sisters, whom he should never see again. In an instant, the whole truth flashed upon the master's mind, and he saw the evil he had done. He could not return the boy to Africa, but he made every reparation in his power. He provided for him every means of improvement, and by the means of his conversion, and treated him ever afterwards, not as a servant, but as brother beloved. Newport, for that was his name, survived Dr. Stiles several years and was, to the end of his life, supported by a legacy which his former master had left him.

Such cases as these may exist now in the Southern States. On the other hand, it is a violation of charity to suppose that there are others who, utterly regardless of justice, knowing what they do to be wrong, and intentionally steel against every notion of conscience, deliberately sacrifice every right of their slaves to their own pecuniary advantage, or the gratification of their love of power; who decide in the question how many years they shall work their fellow-men to death, by a calculation of profit and loss, and who exult in the power of subjecting to their uncontrolled will—a will as voracious, lustful, tyrannical and cruel—as many human beings as by purchase they can appropriate to themselves.

Let us now take these two extremes. These men are both slaveholders. They both do a wrong act in holding a fellow-man in bondage. But would any one confound the moral character of the one with that of the other? The one may be a brother beloved, desirous from his heart of doing the will of God, so far as his heart is revealed to him. The other is a monster in iniquity—since the slave-trade exists I will not say without a parallel—but surely without many superiors in wickedness. And who does not see that the interval between these two extremes may be filled up with every gradation of guiltiness?

And hence it is that I perceive, in reflecting on this subject, wide ground for the exercise of Christiana charity. With a deep conviction of the universal wrong of the act, I have very dissimilar views of the guilt of the actors. Some of them, with me, I believe to be un sin, tyrannical, and in utter disregard of the dearest rights of their fellow-men. Others, I believe to be venial, and I uphold this justification, I believe that it is innocent, and exercise the power which they suppose theirs, as rightfully to possess with exemplary kindness, with paternal tenderness, and with a religious care for the souls that are, as they believe, committed to their charge. I cannot include these two classes in the same sweeping sentence of condemnation. In the one, though I see and lament their errors, I perceive the lineaments of the Christian character, in many cases strongly and beautifully expressed. Such men, while I testify against what seem to me their errors, I must receive as brethren, and I delight to co-operate with them in every good work, provided I so do it as not to imply any participation with what I believe to be wrong. Towards the others, I entertain the same sentiments which I entertain towards any other wicked and inhuman men. I believe them to be not only doing wrong, but to be also exceedingly guilty—excluded by their guilt from all hope of salvation, unless they repent of this sin.

Hence I can never approve of those appeals which treat all men at the South as though they were, in respect to slavery, under the same condemnation; and which apply to all indiscriminately, epithets which certainly belong to no more than a part. Hence I considered much of the action of the churches and associations at the North, to be false in principle and unchristian in practice. It affirms guilt of the actor, instead of affirming it of the mind of the actor; hence it makes the act, at all times and under all circumstances, of the same guiltiness; and it uniformly attaches to an action the worst motives, instead of ascribing to it as good motives as the circumstances attending upon it will allow.

I should also add, that the degree of guilt attendant upon a wrong action, must be continually changing with the progress of light and knowledge. Every one sees that Dr. Stiles, in the case above alluded to, could not, at the present time, send a barrel of rum to Africa in exchange for a human being, without being a very wicked man. Sixty or seventy years since he did it, and he was a very good man. It is much more difficult for a man at the present time to hold his fellow-men in bondage, in ignorance, than it was twenty years since. The whole civilized world has been agitated upon this question. Great Britain, from a conviction of moral obligation, has liberated her slaves at an expenditure of a hundred millions of dollars. The subject is producing fearful excitement throughout our whole country, and threatens us with evils which I dare scarcely contemplate, and to which, in your letter, you have so eloquently alluded. Under these circumstances, it surely becomes every man who holds men in bondage, to inquire whether he can be innocent in the matter, or whether he can be innocent in the sight of "the Judge of the whole earth." If Jefferson trembled for his country when he remembered that God is just, and declared that "in case of insurrection the Almighty has no attribute that can take part with us in such a contest," surely it becomes a disciple of Jesus Christ to pause and reflect. And besides, although this subject has been pressed offensively, and has naturally produced irritation, it should be borne in mind, that anger in the bosom of a wise man is always short-lived. It is time for us to abstract the truth from the circumstances that surround it, and endeavor to ascertain our duty, each one for himself.

I will refer to one other condition, by which the personal guilt of holding men in bondage may be modified; it is the law of the community in which we live. I have already shown that such laws can never affect the right or wrong of an action. They may, however, affect the guilt or innocence of an actor. For instance, the law of the state may forbid no man to manumit a slave without giving to the public securities for his maintenance through life, and I may be unable to give such securities. It may forbid me to manumit my slaves without removing them out of the State, and they may themselves be unwilling to be removed, and may be unable, young and old together, to support themselves by labor in another climate. Or, the laws may be of such a nature that I can only manumit them under circumstances which would render their return to relentless bondage almost inevitable. I do not pretend to specify all the cases that may arise of this nature. In such circumstances as these I can easily conceive of a course of action which might be innocent, even though the relation of master and slave existed. The master might become convinced of the wrong of slavery, and feel that he had no right over these human beings. The law, however, would not allow him to liberate them on any conditions with which it is in his power to comply. What then can he do? I answer, he may, from the moment that he is thus convinced, hold them not for his present but for theirs. If they, in their present condition, are unable to support themselves in other States, he may change that condition by teaching them habits of self-reliance and profitable industry. He may cultivate their intellects and improve their morals; and having done this, he may emancipate them just as rapidly as divine Providence shall present the opportunity. He who acts thus, or in any other way, in the fear of God, acts upon the principle that he holds this relation for the good of the slave, honestly and earnestly laboring, at any personal sacrifice, to terminate it as soon as he is able, seems to me innocent of the guilt of slavery.

Now I do not that there are many just such men among our brethren at the South. I have known Christian slaveholders who have devoted themselves through life to the welfare, temporal and spiritual, of their slaves, with the spirit of the most self-denying missionaries; and who, I confidently believe, if they could do it with a reasonable prospect of improving the condition of their slaves, would gladly manumit them and support themselves by daily labor at the North. Such men and women I honor to be human nature. They are the true friends of their race. I am pained at the circumstances in which they are placed; but

being so placed, I know not how they could act more worthily.

This is one extreme. Here, as in the previous case, there is another extreme. No one will deny that there are slaveholders of a very different character from these to whom I have now alluded. There are men who love the very law which gives them the power over their fellow-men; who daily strive to render that law more stringent; who, without regard either to the rights of man or the law of God, use the power which the law has given them over the slave, to the uttermost, and who resist by main force and every moral position of the law, to hold those who think differently from them, in bondage to enable them to act towards their slaves as their consciences shall dictate.

Here then we have men who are slaveholders equally in form, but of the most dissimilar moral character. The one class may be honestly and prayerfully laboring, to the best of their ability, to obey the Christian precept, "As ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them." The other class allow no law, human or divine, to interfere with the exercise of their oppressive and tyrannical will. And between these extremes, as I said before, how many gradations of guiltiness may intervene!

Here then, again, is there room for the exercise of charity. I am not so simple as to believe, because there are some slaveholders of the first class, that all slaveholders are such; nor do I hold that the existence of slavery under some circumstances without moral guilt, proves that slavery under other circumstances is innocent; or

MISCELLANY.

FROM THE MORNING HERALD.

A DANCE FOR THE NAMELESS.

In a dream, in a dream,
By the cold glimmering stream,
Her pillow, moss only,
She lay with her head on the bank,
And long hair in raven bands,
Still, still and lonely.

Was it sleep? was it sleep?
With dreams dark and deep,
That had to become her?
With her small snowy hands,
And long hair in raven bands,
How shall we name her?

O'er the robes that white
That shrouded form so slight,
The wool-sail was creeping;
On the cheek was clear
There lay a piteous tear—
She had been weeping.

Shut, shut beneath the sky,
Were her soft gleaming eyes,
The life dropping over—
Her sleep was deep and sound,
On the damp, chilling ground;
Where woe her lover!

Above her leaves were stirred,
For there a little bird
In sunny whirled,
Had built a nesting nest,
And the brood beneath its breast
Kept its little noisy band.

Still, still and lonely:
Yielding no to care,
Her white arms were folded—
Thick-spread along her way,
Dark-colored berries lay,
Where they had nestled.

When her mossy hair,
Long had she lain we fear,
The stones were not colder
Down in the gleamy stream,
Nor did so wild a wind
To the beholder.

Bright in her loneliness!
Whom did her beauty bless?
Gave her heart to the reason?
Who told her wrong had done?
Who told her wrong had done?
Who told her wrong had done?

Loved she Love's reason?
Who told her wrong had done?
Who told her wrong had done?
Who told her wrong had done?
Who told her wrong had done?
Who told her wrong had done?

This much I will know,
Here in her voiceless way,
The green leaves around her
Making no sound or plaint,
Calm, lowly as a saint—
Death came to LEAVELAND.

Cincinnati, July 10th, 1845.

WILLIAM, WILLIAM, DON'T LOOK DOWN!

BY E. BURRITT THE LEARNED BLACKSMITH.

The scene opens with a view of the great
Natural Bridge, in Virginia. There are
three or four lads standing in the channel
below, looking up with awe to the vast arch
of unheaven rocks, with the almighty bridge
over these everlasting abutments, where the
morning stars sang together. The little
piece of sky spanning those measureless
piers is full of stars, although it is mid-day.
It is almost five hundred feet from where
they stand, up those perpendicular bulwarks
of limestone, to the key rock of the vast
arch, which appears to be only the size
of a man's hand. The silence of death is
revered more impressive by the little
stream that falls from rock to rock down the
channel. The sun is darkened, and the
boys have unconsciously uncovered their
heads, as if standing in the presence-chamber
of the Majesty of the whole earth. At
last this feeling begins to wear away; they
begin to look around them. They see the
names of hundreds cut in the limestone
abutments. A new feeling comes over their
hearts, and their knives are in hand in an
instant. "What man has done man can
do," is their watchword, while they draw
themselves up and carve their names a foot
above those of a hundred full-grown men,
who had been there before them.

They are all satisfied with this feat
of physical exertion, except one, whose exam-
ple illustrates the folly of the majority,
that there is no royal road to intellectual
eminence. This ambitious youth sees a
name just above his reach, a name that will
be green in the memory of the world, when
those of Alexander, Caesar, and Bonaparte,
shall rot in oblivion. It was the name of
Washington. Before he marched with
Braddock to the fatal field, he had been
there, and left his name a foot above all his
predecessors. It was a glorious thought of
a boy to write his name side by side with
that of the great Father of his Country—
and he grasps his knife with a firm hand,
and clinging to a little jutting crag, he cut
into the limestone, about a foot above where
he stands; but as he puts his feet and hands
under those massive stones, he finds himself
carefully to his full length, he finds himself
foot above every name chronicled in the
mighty wall. While his companions are
regarding him with concern and admiration,
he cuts his name in huge capitals, large
and deep, into that flinty abutment. His knife
is still in his hand, and strength in his sin-
ews, and a new created aspiration in his
heart.

AGRICULTURAL.

ASPARAGUS.—MR. WRIGHTMAN CHAPMAN,

of Middlebury, Vt., raised the finest aspara-
gus we ever tasted. Noticing its superi-
ority, we inquired how it was grown. Mr.
C. said it was raised by what he called the
French mode. Instead of making a deep
trench as in the ordinary way, he selected
a piece of thick sward in a rich place, made
up a good compost of old manure, muck,
and loam, and raised a bed to the height of
twelve or fifteen inches, into which he set
the root. There is certainly "no mistake"
about the extra size and unusual richness
of the asparagus which we saw and ate,
produced in this way.

PRESERVATION OF WOOD.—Kyan's

celebrated patent, it is well known, consists
of impregnating the pores of wood with cor-
rosive sublimate. Bennett's Antiseptic So-
lution, for the same purpose, is a solution
of one pound of chloride of zinc in five
gallons of water, and has been found supe-
rior to Kyan's patent solution. Another
simple process consists in the application of
cresote, along with coal tar, and other bi-
tuminous substances. The latter is thoroughly
saturated to the centre of the wood, and great
rapidity. A load of fir timber will absorb
four gallons; close-grained timber less. The
price of the cresote is 3 pence sterling
per gallon; in some places not more than
2 pence. Preserved timber, by this process,
is supplied for rail-roads at 15 shillings
a load more than the common price. Wood
treated in this way is said to become
nearly water-proof, and requires no paint-
ing. [It will of course be understood that
the "cresote" spoken of is not the article
sold in the drug shops, which is very costly,
but a much cruder substance, similar to the
substance sold many years ago, for smoking
hams, under the name of *pyroligneous acid*.—*Albany Cultivator*.]

LIQUID MANURE.—The Chinese, who are

particularly skilful in the management of
manure, are extremely careful not to waste
the smallest portion; and, according to Sir
George Staunton, they prefer the dung of
birds to that of all others, and next to that
night-soil, which they apply in a liquid
state.

FROM THE ALBANY CULTIVATOR.

Mr. TUCKERMAN. Among the various objects
that engage the attention of the agricul-
turalist, few have higher claims upon his
care than the cultivation of fruit. When
man was fresh from the hands of his maker,
the fruits of his garden became the sole
objects of his culture, as they constituted
his entire, yet ample means of subsistence.
Health, vigor and longevity resulted from
this simple fare; and there can hardly be a
doubt that even at this day, a nearer ap-
proach to this primitive simplicity of diet
would contribute much to the preservation
of health and happiness among mankind.

THE CULTIVATION OF FRUIT.

When we consider the great and constantly
increasing varieties of fruit that are
capable of being cultivated in our climate,
their wonderful capacity for improvement,

COUNTERFEIT DETECTOR.

THE FOLLOWING BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THIS

counterfeit Bank Notes may be passed off in
this community, may, by any person who will
demand a close examination, be detected, and
against imposition and loss. All new counterfeit
notes, as they appear, will be added to this list, and fully
described.

KENTUCKY BANKS.

BANK OF LOUISVILLE.—1's spurious—payable to
bearer, dated April 1, 1844. Vignette—antebellum
bank, with a steam locomotive. No one ever
issued by the Bank.

BANK OF LOUISVILLE.—5's payable to B. Baird, K.
Thurston, Cashier, John S. Baird, President. Had
its circulation, and particularly the head, in the
centre of the note.

5's letter C, payable to B. Baird, dated Oct. 6,
1833. The signatures coarse and the ink much
faded. The word "Kentucky" is in the same
denomination, and date, are payable to W.
Neatbit.

BANK OF KENTUCKY AND BRANCHES.—5's made
by the Bank of Kentucky, and its branches, and
of various dates, signed J. C. Gwathmey,
Cashier, W. H. Pope, President. Signatures and
filling same hand writing—the ink of a bluish tint.

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10's letter C, payable to B. Baird, dated Oct. 6,
1833. The signatures coarse and the ink much
faded. The word "Kentucky" is in the same
denomination, and date, are payable to W.
Neatbit.

COUNTERFEIT DETECTOR.

THE FOLLOWING BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THIS

counterfeit Bank Notes may be passed off in
this community, may, by any person who will
demand a close examination, be detected, and
against imposition and loss. All new counterfeit
notes, as they appear, will be added to this list, and fully
described.

KENTUCKY BANKS.

BANK OF LOUISVILLE.—1's spurious—payable to
bearer, dated April 1, 1844. Vignette—antebellum
bank, with a steam locomotive. No one ever
issued by the Bank.

BANK OF LOUISVILLE.—5's payable to B. Baird, K.
Thurston, Cashier, John S. Baird, President. Had
its circulation, and particularly the head, in the
centre of the note.

5's letter C, payable to B. Baird, dated Oct. 6,
1833. The signatures coarse and the ink much
faded. The word "Kentucky" is in the same
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BANK OF KENTUCKY AND BRANCHES.—5's made
by the Bank of Kentucky, and its branches, and
of various dates, signed J. C. Gwathmey,
Cashier, W. H. Pope, President. Signatures and
filling same hand writing—the ink of a bluish tint.

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